Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

1993

The State of Utah v. Grove L. Flower : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Jan Graham; Attorney General; Joanne C. Slotnik; Assistant Attorney General; Attorneys for
Appellee.
Joan C. Watt; Matthew G. Nielsen; Salt Lake Legal Defender Association; Attorneys for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Utah v. Flower, No. 930566 (Utah Court of Appeals, 1993).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca1/5497

This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930566-CA
Priority No. 2

GROVE L. FLOWER,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable William B. Bohling, Judge, presiding.

JOAN C. WATT
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC,
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL
236 State Capitol
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Attorneys for Appellee

evppEAiS

FILED
MAR 2 2 1996

q 3 ^ ^ 4 - ^ U R T OF APPEAL

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Case No. 930566-CA
Priority No. 2

GROVE L. FLOWER,
Defendant/Appellant.

REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT
Appeal from a judgment of conviction for Possession of a
Controlled Substance, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1953 as amended), in the Third
Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, the Honorable William B. Bohling, Judge, presiding.

JOAN C. WATT
MATTHEW G. NIELSEN
SALT LAKE LEGAL DEFENDER ASSOC.
424 East 500 South, Suite 300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorneys for Appellant
JAN GRAHAM
ATTORNEY GENERAL
JOANNE C. SLOTNIK

ilium mini mini

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
INTRODUCTION
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE ATTENUATION ARGUMENT IS
PROPERLY PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.

.

POINT II. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT
ANY CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS SUFFICIENTLY
ATTENUATED FROM THE ILLEGALITIES.
CONCLUSION

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990)

9

Rhode Island v. Innis. 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct.
1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990)
State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992)
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201 (Utah 1993)

12
5,6
2, 3
6

State v. Ham, 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 43 (Utah App.
1996)

3, 7

State v. Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1053

3

State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1994)

3

State v. Smith, 909 P.2d 236 (Utah 1995)

7

State v. South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994)

8

State v. Termolin, 805 P.2d 182 (Utah 1990)

7

State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256 (Utah 1993)
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984)
Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 83
S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963)

5, 6, 11
7
5, 6

STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Amendment IV, United States Constitution

ii

8, 9

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
THE STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee,

:

v.

:

GROVE L. FLOWER,

:

Defendant/Appellant.

Case No. 930566-CA
Priority No. 2

:

INTRODUCTION
Defendant/Appellant Grove L. Flower relies on his opening
brief and refers this Court to that brief for the statements of
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary of
the argument.

Appellant responds to the State's brief as

follows.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Flower's claim that the State did not establish that the
consent was attenuated from the illegalities is properly before
this Court.

The trial court ruled on this issue as evidenced by

the Findings and Conclusions which include a determination that
the consent "was sufficiently attenuated from the protective
sweep."

In addition, although the State had the burden of

establishing that the agents had not exploited the illegality, it
failed to make any attenuation argument in the trial court.
Furthermore, Defendant adequately raised the issue when he argued
the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
The State failed to establish that the illegalities and
consent were attenuated.
against attenuation.

All three Thurman/Arroyo factors weigh

ARGUMENT
POINT I. THE ATTENUATION ARGUMENT IS PROPERLY
PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW.
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief)
The State argues the attenuation issue is not properly
before the Court on appeal because "Defendant's trial court
argument hinged on a fruit of the poisonous tree 'but for'
analysis" and " [t]he Utah Supreme Court has specifically eschewed
the 'but for' test."

State's brief at 17.

The State's waiver

argument is without merit for three reasons.
First, the counsel drafted Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law ("Findings and Conclusions") include an
express conclusion that "[t]he initial consent given by the
defendant to search the safe when he was contacted in the front
yard of the house was sufficiently attenuated from the protective
sweep."

R. 310 (emphasis added); see Addendum B to Appellant's

opening brief.

The Findings and Conclusions also explicitly

state that "[t]he subsequent consent given by the defendant after
his arrest and after his Miranda rights had been given to him was
attenuated from the protective sweep . . . ."
added).

R. 310 (emphasis

Although counsel drafted the Findings and Conclusions,

the trial judge adopted the conclusions when he signed them.1
1

Although this Court is free to disregard counsel drafted
findings (see Appellant's opening brief at 13-14), where the
findings and conclusions drafted by the State include a
determination on an issue which the State later claims was waived,
fairness and common sense require a recognition that the parties
and judge knew the issue was before the court.
Under such
circumstances, this Court should not consider the issue waived.
See generally State v. Belgard, 830 P.2d 264, 266 (Utah 1992)
2

It is well settled that where the trial court is given an
opportunity to decide an issue, takes evidence and issues a
ruling on the merits, that issue is properly preserved for
appeal.

See State v. Belcrard, 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992); State v.

Matsamas, 808 P.2d 1053; State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah
App. 1994).
Although the State suggests that Defendant had an
opportunity to later present an attenuation argument (State's
brief at 19), the existence of a ruling on that issue, as
evidenced by the signed Findings and Conclusions, made further
argument unnecessary.

After losing on a motion, a party is not

required to renew that issue in order to properly preserve the
issue for appeal.

Indeed, counsel who renews issues already

resolved by the trial judge is in danger of receiving a busy
trial judge's wrath.

In this case where the written Findings and

Conclusions include conclusions on the attenuation issue, that
issue is properly preserved for appellate review.
Second, the State has the burden of establishing that any
consent "was sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct."
State v. Ham, 281 Utah Adv. Rep. 43, 47 (Utah App. 1996) (citing
United States v. Melendrez-Gonzalez, 727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir.
1984).

In this case, the State did not make any written or oral

argument that the taint of the police misconduct was sufficiently
attenuated to allow admission of the evidence seized from the
(Supreme Court reviewed issue on appeal which trial court had ruled
on); State v. Parker, 872 P.2d 1041 (Utah 1994) (this Court
reviewed issue where trial court acted on motion).
3

safe.

See R. 39-49, 291-305.

Even after the trial judge told

the parties that he was going to suppress the evidence found in
the room and the lunchbox, the prosecutor made no argument that
the police misconduct was sufficiently attenuated to allow
admission of the contents of the safe.

R. 301-302, 303-306.

Under these circumstances, where the State had the burden of
proving that attenuation dissipated the taint, any waiver which
occurred based on the arguments in the trial court is
attributable to the State, which made no argument that the taint
was dissipated.

Where the State had the burden of establishing

that the prior illegalities and subsequent consent were
attenuated and made no attempt to so argue, any failure by
Defendant to argue attenuation does not waive Defendant's claim
on appeal that the illegality was not attenuated from the
consent.
Third, Flower adequately raised the attenuation argument
so as to preserve it for appellate review.

In his memorandum in

support of his motion to suppress, Flower argued that the
exclusionary rule required that all evidence be suppressed as the
"fruit of the poisonous tree."

R. 35.

At the hearing, he

argued that the illegal conduct precluded admission of the
evidence subsequently obtained from the safe.

R. 2 99.

Defense Counsel: Your Honor, I think the
chronology in this incident is extremely
important, and also the doctrine of the fruit of
the poisonous tree is very important because once
we find any illegal misconduct that violated
fourth amendment rights, or [the Utah
constitution] and as a result of the illegal
violation where something is discovered that's
4

incriminating, everything they found after any
illegal
The Court: I don't agree with that
philosophy. As heretofore stated, the defendant
in this case gave his consent, after having his
rights read to him, to go into the safe.
Defense Counsel: Correct. Your Honor, how
did they get to the point of asking him what was
in the safe? How did they find the safe?

R. 2 99.

As can be seen from this exchange, the trial judge

initially cut off defense counsel when counsel began to argue
that the taint of the illegality was not dissipated.

Defense

counsel responded by pointing out factually that the officers
knew about the safe and got to the point of asking about the safe
based on their prior illegal acts.

R. 299.

While defense

counsel did use the "but for" language challenged by the State in
his memorandum, he also relied on the fruit of the poisonous tree
doctrine in that memorandum and in oral argument.

R. 35, 299,

301-2.
The attenuation analysis outlined in State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990), and State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1262
(Utah 1993), is based on the exclusionary rule and the fruit of
the poisonous tree doctrine embraced in Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441 (1963).
State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690.

In Arroyo, the Utah Supreme

Court stated:
The basis for the second part of the twopart analysis is found in the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine of Wong Sun v. United
States, 371 U.S. 471, 83 S.Ct. 407, 9 L.Ed.2d 441
5

See

(1963), which stated that a trial court must
determine in such a case "'whether granting
establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has
been come at by exploitation of that illegality
or instead by means sufficiently distinguishable
to be purged of the primary taint.'11 371 U.S. at
488, 83 S.Ct. at 417 (quoting Maguire, Evidence
of Guilt 221 (1959)). The "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine has been extended to
invalidate consents which, despite being
voluntary, are nonetheless the exploitation of a
prior police illegality.
Arroyo, 796 P.2d at 690 (emphasis added).
P.2d at 12 72-75.

See also Thurman. 846

By arguing that the consent was "the fruit of

the poisonous tree," defense counsel preserved his attenuation
argument under Arroyo and Thurman because such attenuation
analysis is based on the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine.
Flower's claim that the connection between the prior
illegalities and the consent was not so attenuated as to validate
the search was preserved for appellate review in this case where
(1) the trial judge ruled on the attenuation issue; (2) the State
had the burden of establishing attenuation and made no argument
that the connection between the illegalities and subsequent
consent was attenuated; and (3) defense counsel argued that the
fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine precluded admission of the
items seized from the safe.2
2

In addition, if this Court were to determine that defense
counsel should have done a better job of arguing attenuation, it
nevertheless should reach this issue under the doctrine of plain
error or ineffective assistance of counsel.
Plain error occurs
where the error is obvious and is harmful to the defendant. See
State v. Dunn, 850 P.2d 1201, 1208 (Utah 1993). Both Arroyo and
Thurman were decided prior to the hearing in this case. Because
those cases indicate that an attenuation analysis is required and
suggest that the consent in this case was not attenuated, the error
6

POINT II. THE STATE DID NOT ESTABLISH THAT ANY
CONSENT TO SEARCH WAS SUFFICIENTLY ATTENUATED
FROM THE ILLEGALITIES.
(Reply to Point III of Appellee's Brief)
In a situation similar to that in the present case, this
Court held that the defendant's consent was obtained by the
police exploitation of the prior illegal conduct.
281 Utah Adv. Rep. at 47.

State v. Ham,

In Ham, this Court pointed out that

the State has a heavier burden when a claimed consent follows
police misconduct because "the State must also establish the
existence of intervening factors which prove that the consent was
sufficiently attenuated from the police misconduct."

Ham, 281

Utah Adv. Rep. at 47 (citing United States v. Melendrez-Gonzalez,
727 F.2d 407, 414 (5th Cir. 1984)).

This Court determined that

should have been obvious to the trial judge. The error prejudiced
Flower since the judge denied the portion of his motion to suppress
which dealt with the items in the safe. Had the judge concluded
that the illegality and consent were not attenuated, such items
would have been suppressed. As set forth more fully in Point II of
Appellant's opening brief, the State did not establish that the
consent was attenuated from the illegalities.
Ineffective assistance occurs where a lawyer provides
deficient performance which falls below an objective standard of
reasonableness and such deficient performance results in prejudice
to his/her client. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984); State v. Templin. 805 P.2d 182, 186 (Utah 1990). Prejudice
has been defined as "but for counsel's deficient performance there
is a reasonable probability that the outcome of the trial could
have been different."
State v. Smith, 909 P. 2d 236, 243 (Utah
1995). Assuming this Court requires an attenuation argument which
tracks Arroyo/Thurman in order to preserve this issue for appeal,
counsel performed deficiently in failing to make such an argument.
Utah case law existed at the time of this trial which articulated
specific fruit of the poisonous tree language for the consent
context. Failure to argue that language from controlling case law
was deficient. This failure resulted in prejudice to Flower since
the trial judge admitted the items found in the safe. As set forth
more fully in Appellant's opening brief and Point II of this brief,
the illegalities were not attenuated from the consent.
7

the illegality and consent were not attenuated:
The record shows that a very short time period
had expired between the initial illegal search
and the second "request" for a consent to search.
Additionally, absolutely no intervening events
occurred; defendant's consent was procured during
the ongoing illegal search. Finally, the agents
were obviously seeking evidence demonstrating
that defendant had violated his probation
agreement and were apparently unconcerned with
the provision of defendant's probation agreement
requiring reasonable suspicion.
Although the State recognizes in the present case that it
did not cross-appeal, the State appears to be making an end run
attack on the trial judge's rulings that the protective sweep and
search of the lunchbox violated the Fourth Amendment.

See

footnotes 5 and 6 of State's brief at 20-21, discussion at 20-23
of State's brief.

As the State concedes, by failing to appeal

these rulings, the State cannot contest the propriety of those
determinations as part of its appeal.

Nor can it properly ask

this Court to reassess those determinations at this juncture.
The conclusion that the protective sweep and lunchbox search
violated the Fourth Amendment must therefore stand.

See State v.

South, 885 P.2d 795 (Utah App. 1994) (State cannot argue on
appeal that search warrant was valid where it did not crossappeal on that issue). 3
The State suggests that the purpose and flagrancy prong
weighs in favor of attenuation because the protective sweep "was
not glaringly abusive."

State's brief at 24.

3

The State claims

In addition, the State has not fully briefed its claim that
the protective sweep and lunchbox search were valid.
In the
absence of full briefing, those rulings must stand.
8

that the sweep was close to the line of permissibility because
the officers conducted the sweep based on a previous circumstance
where Kelly apparently had not informed officers that someone
else was in the house.

The officers did not present information

that on that previous occasion, the individual in the house had
endangered the officers.

See R. 128-29, 169.

Nor did the State

present any information that on this occasion, they had a
reasonable belief that there were persons on the premises who
posed a danger to officers or others.

In order to conduct a

valid warrantless sweep in conjunction with an arrest, officers
must have a reasonable belief that there are persons on the
premises who pose a danger to the officers or others.

See

Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325 (1990).
The general safety claim made by the State in this case
could be made in almost any case where a defendant has a prior
criminal record, and does not rise to the constitutionally
required reasonable belief.

The parole agents in this case often

conduct home visits and are charged with knowledge of the
requirements for searching a home.

In the absence of facts

demonstrating a reasonable belief that at the time of entry,
dangerous persons were on the premises, the violation of the
Fourth Amendment should have been apparent to the officers.
In addition, the spontaneity of the search demonstrates
that the officers did not have a reasonable belief that they were
in danger.

Although they knew about the prior incident with

Kelly before going to the house, they did not discuss any plan
9

for protection.

Since no further facts arose suggesting that

there might be dangerous persons on the premises, the officers'
spontaneous decision suggests that they did not have a reasonable
belief they were endangered.

While officers are at times

required to take "prompt, unplanned action," not all prompt,
unplanned actions are constitutionally permissible.

In this case

where nothing about the facts suggested that the officers were
endangered on this occasion, the spontaneous action does not
establish a reasonable belief that there were persons on the
premises who posed a danger to the officers.
The State also claims that since the officers did not
know Flower lived in the house when they did the sweep, "it is
difficult to see how suppression of the evidence related to the
defendant would deter the police conduct that the trial court
found unlawful."

State's brief at 24.

An improper sweep of a

house can turn up all types of evidence.

Suppressing evidence

that officers attempt to use in any case, not just the case
against the person initially targeted, has an obvious deterrent
effect.

If this Court were to say that evidence against Kelly

would be suppressed but not evidence against any other defendant,
officers would be encouraged to make protective sweeps in all
cases, hoping that the evidence located would implicate
associates of the target person.
The misconduct to be deterred is not only the automatic
sweep of the house in the absence of a reasonable suspicion that
the officers were in danger, but also the searching into nooks,
10

the officers' actions in holding the house for two hours in an
attempt to gain further evidence based on what was found during
the illegal sweep, and the agents' actions in showing scales
found during the sweep to each other an hour after the sweep
without first obtaining a warrant.

In this case, where the

officers had no information supporting a reasonable belief that
persons posing a danger were in the house, the purpose and
flagrancy prong weigh in favor of suppression.
The temporal proximity prong also weighs in favor of
suppression.
illegal sweep.

The officers did not leave the premises after the
They enveloped Flower when he arrived and

immediately questioned him based on items they found during the
illegal sweep.

Unlike Thurman, Flower had not been in the

presence of the officers for several hours, and the effects on
Flower of the illegal sweep did not have time to dissipate.

As

soon as Flower became aware of the sweep, the agents made it
clear that they wanted to know what was in the safe they found
during the course of that illegal sweep.

Furthermore, the

officers continued in their illegal activities by searching the
lunchbox.
Finally, the State argues that Flower's conduct in
responding to the agent's query that he "would sure like to know
what was in the lunchbox" and the administration of Miranda
warnings were intervening circumstances.

Both of these claims,

if endorsed by this Court, could essentially swallow the
intervening circumstances requirement.
11

First, the wording of the agent's query called for a
response.

A statement does not need to be made in the form of a

question in order to constitute questioning or interrogation.
See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64
L.Ed.2d 297 (1980).

Any "words or actions that are reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response" are considered
interrogation.

Id.

The agent obviously made the statement that

"he sure would like to know what was in that safe" in an effort
to evoke a response and consent to search from Flower.

The

illegal search led directly to the agent's statement regarding
the contents of the safe and lunchbox.

Flower's honest response

to the agent's inquisitiveness was not an independent intervening
circumstance.

Rather, it was the direct response to the

officer's attempt to elicit a response.
Second, the State argues that the Miranda warnings were
an intervening circumstance prior to the second consent.
brief at 27.

State's

Flower actually invoked his right to silence.

The

fact that officers continued to question him after he had invoked
the right would necessarily cause a defendant to perceive the
officers as refusing to recognize his invocation.

An affirmative

response following a request for consent after a defendant
invoked his right to silence does not constitute an independent
intervening circumstance.

Indeed, the State provides no case law

in support of its claim that the Miranda warnings are an
intervening circumstance.
In conclusion, all three of the Arroyo/Thurman factors
12

weigh in favor of suppression.

The State failed to establish

that the illegalities were attenuated from the consent.

The

trial judge therefore erred in refusing to suppress the items
seized from the safe.

CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Flower respectfully
requests that his conviction be reversed and the case remanded to
the trial court for a new trial or dismissal.

SUBMITTED this

<^£k day of March, 1996.

JOAN C. WATT
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant

MATTHEW G. NIELSEN
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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